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1.0: Introduction
The main objective of this study is to better understand Central American and Caribbean governments' ability to service their debt, derived from the estimation of their fiscal limits, defined as the maximum level of debt that are able and willing to serve (Bi and Leeper, 2010) . Using simulations of state dependent fiscal limits for eighteen (18) 1 economies we produced results that were not previously available for these economies, showing varying and wider distribution limits for the simulations when applying an open economy model subject to term of trade shocks versus the same model without considering this particular shock. The results indicated that terms of trade volatility impacted the ability of these developing economies in servicing their debt.
The paper provides another critical tool to the policy makers and central bankers to help determine the best way in understanding fiscal limits derived from simulating macroeconomic uncertainty and fiscal policy interactions in these developing economies of Central America and the Caribbean.
The methodologies used analyzed the fiscal limit, which is defined as the maximum level of debt that governments are able to service given the current underlying macroeconomic fundamentals of the economies; the present value of fiscal surpluses, the state of government transfers and subsidies and the impact of sovereign risk on the economy. (Bi 2011 and Juessen et al 2011) . Using an open economy Real Business Cycle (RBC) model for simulating fiscal limits, we derived dynamic Laffer curves, which are obtained endogenously as governments normally raises the tax rate in response to a rising debt level (Leeper 1991) This understanding of the fiscal limit, or the maximum level of debt that Central American and Caribbean economies can service, is critical for these small developing economies, some of which currently have high spending levels due to transfers and subsidies and also have a history of high political risk that thwarts tax and spending adjustment across the business cycle. These economies commonly experience low and declining fiscal surpluses, accompanied with rising sovereign debt especially after the period of the great recession, and continue to be impacted, sometimes negatively by the state of world trade and the economies of their leading trade partners. The understanding of fiscal limits within these economies is vital as policy makers and central bankers are continually searching for methodologies and tools that can help them better define these limits, provide more robust forecast of the ability of their economies in raising debt and the necessary fiscal policies in containing debt and default risk within the short and long term. (Bi 2011 and Bi et al 2013) Our paper provides such evidence of fiscal limits for all the economies studied, and shows, through the simulation of fiscal limits in an open economy model, that the terms of trade shocks plays an important role in shaping fiscal limits distribution for most economies included in the study.
The organization of the study is as follows: Section 2 contains a clearer understanding of why the studying fiscal limits are important to developing economies; Section 3 presents the latest literature review on fiscal limits. Section 4 discusses the methodologies used, the data and parameters used in deriving the simulation of the fiscal limits. This is followed by the simulation results, discussions, policy implications and conclusions.
2.0: Why understanding Fiscal Limits is important to developing economies.
Fiscal limit is usually the highest level of debt that the government is able to service and is dependent on the current state of macroeconomic fundamentals; the present value of fiscal surpluses, the state of government transfers and subsidies and the impact of sovereign risk on the economy, (Bi 2011 and Bi et al 2013) . The simulations of the limits are demonstrated in endogenously derived dynamic Laffer curves. The peak of the distribution curves shows the point at which governments are limited in further raising tax revenues to finance sovereign debt, hence their ability to adequately service sovereign debt. Usually, even before this point and with the increasing possibility of reaching the peak of the Laffer curve, householders or agents will require a higher risk premium on sovereign debt, which could also limit financing sovereign debt. (Uribe, 2006) The fiscal limit, which is state dependent on existing macroeconomic fundamentals and stochastic in nature as random disturbances affects the future path of fiscal surpluses, are effectively defined at each period and will depend on the macroeconomic circumstances and fiscal policy (Leeper 1991 Table 1 below and Figure 5 showing public debt to GDP in appendix).
With the increasing levels of debt and in most cases low growth or weak macroeconomic fundamentals and declining fiscal surpluses, developing economies of the Central America and the Caribbean are becoming more concerned regarding their ability to adequately service sovereign debt from lower fiscal surpluses with the increase possibility of sovereign default risk (See table 2 
Households
The household derive utility from the consumption of a bundle containing a private and public, , and leisure . The composite is a CES index of both types of goods
Where and are the participation of the consumption of private good in the basket, and the degree of substitutability, respectively.
Preferences are characterized by the following utility function, that households maximize over an infinite horizon choosing optimal paths for composite good, labor, and investment and capital in the tradable and nontradable sectors:
Where . Where is the discount factor, σ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and is the weight of leisure in the utility function.
Subject to the budget constraint, Where , , represent sector specific investment expenditure and capital. The spending in investment goods is subject to adjustment cost with the parameter , where this feature is necessary to close the model in the terminology of Schmith-Grohe and Uribe (2003) . Finally, is the rate of depreciation of capital, that is assume is the same in both sectors.
The law of motion of sectoral capital is:
And the aggregate investment is
The first order condition of this optimization program deliver the following intertemporal equilibrium condition for the households:
Aggregate private consumption and investment are split between tradables and nontradables in an imperfect substitutability way, through a CES aggregate function with intratemporal elasticity of substitution of and home bias degree of .
In terms of the distribution of labor between sectors, the CES aggregator is Where is the steady state share of labor in the nontradable sector. And is the elasticity of substitution between sectors. The household chooses the optimal amount of labor for each sector solving the intratemporal problem:
Subject to
From the first order condition we obtain the labor supply for each sector
From last cost minimization problem, the aggregate wage index can be derived as:
In this model, prices are presented as relative prices respect to the price of the composite private consumption good, which is set to 1. Defining as the relative price of non tradables, and as CPI real exchange rate (assuming the law of one prince holds), then
Firms.
Bi, et. al. (2013) assume that firms in both sectors are perfectly competitive, and the technology of production is a Cobb-Douglas production function in both sectors, and Where and are the levels of production, and and at are the total factor of productivity that follows an AR (1) processes. is the productivity shock that it is assumed the same for both sectors.
Each firm in both sectors takes the prices of production factors as given and maximizes their profit functions and obtains the demand of labor and capital for each sector. That is, Subject to their respective production functions. From the first order conditions the demand for each factor of production is derived:
Where are de term of trade, which is assume that follows an exogenous process
Government
In this model the government collects taxes and issues an external debt bond to finance public expenditure , transfers and the external debt service. In terms of public expenditure, the government consumes both tradables and non tradables, so is represented as a CES basket of these types of goods. So the price index for government goods is given by:
Where is the degree of home bias and is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution.
The government flow budget constraint is given by:
Where is the price of foreign bonds and is the number of unit of local goods raised with the selling of . In Bi, et al (2013) , are the post-default liabilities introduced to study the dynamic of fiscal limit when the government randomly defaults. In our research we do not study that case, so
We assume that foreign creditors are risk-neutral, so the demand for domestic bond is .
Iterating forward, and using the transversality condition for government, , the government budget constraints is can be rewritten as:
i.e. the external debt at the start to period t is the present value of future surpluses.
The evolution of fiscal policy variables are the following. Government expenditure, , is assume to be procyclical, as the evidence suggests 2 for developing countries. Relative to taxes, the policy rule establishes that taxes adjust to maintain sustainability. Thus, the expenditure and taxes rules are, , with
Where for
Market clearing
The market clearing conditions require that factor market clear, so labor and capital supplies equals to their respective demands in each market and in the aggregate, so 2 Gavin and Perotti (1997) The output in local units is
Market clearing condition for nontradables is
The balance of payment condition is
Defining the fiscal limit
As in Bi, et. al. (2013) , the fiscal limit is defined as the maximum level of debt in unit of local goods that a government is able and willing to serve. Based on the definition of government budget constraint, the fiscal limit can be described as the present value of future surpluses evaluated at the top of the Laffer curve.
In relation to the willingness to pay, this is approached by a political risk factor bounded by the range 0 and 1, so that low levels of this parameters reflect high levels of political risk, and as a consequence lower levels of fiscal limits. In other words, countries with high levels of political risk are more prone to declare default at lower levels of debt to GDP ratios.
One of the characteristics of fiscal limits is its state depended nature, implying that fiscal limits are random variables, as the state of the economy in each moment is determined by random shocks, which in this model are productivity, term of trade processes and the evolution of fiscal policy that have a random component each. Formally, from the intertemporal budget constraint evaluated at the distribution of fiscal limit is,
Where the state of the economy is . and are the government revenue and the real exchange rate associated with . is the government willingness to pay the public debt or the level of political risk, that we assumed constant.
As Bi et al (2013) comments, the computation of the maximum tax, consistent with dynamic Laffer curves, delivers values slightly above those observed in the sample, so that fiscal limits are evaluated at the maximum tax rate observe in the sample.
The simulation of the fiscal limit distribution involves the following steps:
1. Using the procedure describe by Bi et al (2013), we solve the non-linear model for each country and obtain the decision rules for the state variables of the model.
2. After solving, we simulate the model 1000 periods, randomly drawing the exogenous shocks for TPF, government expenditure and the term of trade, and compute and . Then, we compute the definition of fiscal limit for this particular sequence of shocks.
3. We repeat the simulation 10,000 to have
4.2: Data

4.3: Parameters and calibration of the model
The model is calibrated for 18 Caribbean and Central America economies to simulate the distribution of fiscal limits. To accomplish this task, our calibration strategy assumes that some parameters common across economies, and the rest are obtained from sample data of key model variables for these economies.
Because of lack of previous studies or empirical evidence, we rely in the Bi, et. al.
(2013)'s calibration and other studies for common parameters. calibrated to 0.44. The sectoral mobility of labor, , is set to 1. In addition, , the steady state labor income share of nontradable sector in labor income, is equal to 0.5. Finally, the investment adjustment parameter is set to 1.7.
Other common parameters across countries are the labor income shares in national income which are calibrated to 0.5. We assume that both sectors have the same labor intensively technology, so . Steady state labor share is set to 0.25, which means that households spend 25% of their day at work. Finally, as our model is calibrated in on annual basis data, the depreciation rate of capital is 10% per year in both sectors.
The country specific parameters are calibrated using annual data on percapita GDP, real After detrending, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, we estimate the persistence and volatility parameters for the exogenous processes (productivity, terms of trade and fiscal policy variables). To obtain reliable parameters, we include dummy variables to control outliers in years of financial or important crisis. Finally, data for the political risk parameter is taken from the International Country Risk Guide's Index of political risk. Table 4 .2 shows calculated parameters for each economy.
The discount factor, , was computed through average ex-post real interest rate for each country. The average ex-post real rate is around 9%, which implies a discount rate of In relation to fiscal parameters, the ratio of government expenditure over GDP on average is 25%, with countries with traditional low levels like Guatemala (14%), Dominican
Republic (16%) and Costa Rica (17%). Despite The Bahamas, countries in the Small
Antilles have the highest average of government expenditure in the sample, with
Barbados at the top with 37% of GDP.
Similar to the distribution of the rate of public expenditure to GDP, government revenues over GDP are smaller in the mentioned Central America countries. The sample average for these economies is 14% versus the average of full sample of 22%.
Finally, average public debt to GDP is 63% with a standard deviation of 33%. Small
Antilles countries and Jamaica all have debt-to-GDP ratios greater than 50%, with countries like St. Kitts, Jamaica, and Antigua and Barbuda standing out with ratios over 100%. Central America and the Great Antilles countries (excluding Jamaica and Nicaragua) exhibit ratios under 50%.
In terms of parameters characterizing the assumed behavior of fiscal policy, government spending behaves in a pro-cyclical manner with respect to GDP, meaning that government spending is reduced when economic growth slows down. For the considered sample, only Belize and St. Lucia display a counter-cyclical behavior. The tax-to-debt adjustment elasticity suggests that these countries tend to raise taxes when debt hikes.
Source: International Financial Statistics, ECLAC Statistics Database, Central Banks and Ministries of Finance of selected economies. Figures 1, 2 and 3 below) . The results are shown below in endogenously dynamic Laffer curves.
By determining the fiscal limits, we recognized that economies sovereign default risk increases as existing debt levels exceeds the endogenously determined Laffer curves, as rising tax revenues will be increasing unable to cover the mounting debt. For most of the economies studied, the fiscal limit using the open economy model lies at a lower bound than the economy without terms of trade shock simulated Laffer curve.
The economies with the greatest ability to service debt given economic fundamentals and fiscal policy and derived from the dynamic Laffer curve within Central America were Panama (167%), Nicaragua (83%) and El Salvador and Belize respectively (68%) and the lowest were Costa Rica (37%) and Honduras (43%).
Among the Caribbean economies Trinidad and Tobago (138%), Jamaica (105%) and Antigua and Barbuda (91%) were listed among the economies showing highest endogenously determined Laffer curves, while Dominican Republic (43%), The Bahamas (50%) and Barbados (61%) were on the lower level. Figure 4 and Figure 5 in the Appendix) several economies within the study are rapidly expanding public debt and appear to lie above the endogenously determined Laffer curves bound. These economies need to urgently engage in fiscal consolidation, reform and debt relief or restructuring strategies to improve both the short and long term outcomes. 
